Nazi A-Bomb & Russian (Internal) Lies!
Originally posted on September 1, 2013 @ 8:11 PM
Nazi A-Bomb Story Expands–More From Russia!
But first, an update. Through some as yet undetermined miscommunication, the yield for the Nazi A-Bomb was inadvertently reported by JKI as being 5 KT (kilotons), when it was, in fact, 7 KT, or ~ 1/2 the yield of Little Boy, the U.S. A-Bomb that wiped out Hiroshima. This doesn't affect the core story; it merely closes the gap between the planned 30 KT yield for the Nazi A-bomb and the actual 7 KT yield.
The same, though, can't be said of recently supplied information from Russia. It would appear to force a complete rethink of a whole series of conclusions I drew regarding the particulars of the Nazi A-bomb strike at Kursk, Russia, July 11, 1943. But is this true? Yes and no!
Lies, Damn Lies and (Soviet/Russian) Statistics!
For purposes of evaluating new information from Russia, I'm going to use “Russian” as a term to describe both the (Communist) Soviet era and post-Soviet era information. It's easier on both the readers and myself this way. Where needed, I shall point out the applicable dates.
To begin, the Russians don't speak of World War II generally, but of the GPW (Great Patriotic War), which began June 22,1941 with the invasion of Russia by Hitler's Germany and ended May 9, 1945 with the surrender of Germany to Stalin's Russia following the Fall of Berlin. The GPW is the Russians' principal area of military interest and the informing principle of most of their military analyses and conclusions since.
But what if their data set's screwed up? What if their carefully arrived at conclusions are derived from incorrect premises based on deliberately falsified data? And how does this mess affect, if at all, the Nazi A-bomb story, as seen from the Russian side of the fence? Is there any evidence of a Russian track record of “cooking the books” and other extreme measures in order to hide defeats, disasters and other failures? Yes!
Battle of Berlin: Stalin's Big Lie
Archival sources in the Battle of Berlin Wiki list the Russian (to include, presumably, the subordinated Polish Army) as 81,116 killed or missing and 280, 251. This may confuse readers used to the American categories of KIA (Killed In Action), WIA (Wounded In Action) and MIA (Missing In Action). Thus, by Russian reckoning, the war-ending Battle of Berlin cost Mother Russia a total of 361,367 total casualties.
Is that really a reliable number? What if, say, the actual number were 40% higher? How glorious would the victory be if the Russian people, let alone the world, found out the truth? A shocking documentary that aired, best I can tell, once, presented exactly that kind of information (some 600,00 casualties), together with ghastly drawings done by a nurse in one of the many classified hospitals set up to deal with the shattered sons and daughters of the Motherland, people so horribly maimed Stalin figured even the war-hardened (and war-weary) Russian populace couldn't bear to see the incredible human price of his great victory ending the GPW.
Special Hospitals for Special Problems
Hiding those who sustain particularly disturbing or revelatory service-related injuries in the service of the Motherland wasn't something practiced solely during the GPW. It was very much a reality during the Cold War and is probably still done today.
In a nation whose laundry soap and condom production figures were State secrets, and whose nuclear submarines and a few nuclear-powered surface warships were the pride of Russia, it simply wasn't allowed to reveal sailors were getting terribly irradiated, as seen in this biting and frighteningly close to the target Cold War jibe. “How do you recognize a man from the Northern Fleet? He glows in the dark!” The Northern Fleet in the scathing joke refers to the Red Banner Northern Fleet, which was the single largest concentration of Cold War Russian nuclear warships. If they won't admit their own self-caused radiation casualties in their Navy, care to place bets on their willingness to admit any Nazi A-Bomb-related losses?
There were/doubtless still are also special prison (mental) hospitals in which even Red Army generals could be forcibly committed because of their “mental illness.” Consider, for example the remarkable parallels between the experience of General Grigorenko in Russia and the Falun Gong members in the PRC (People's Republic of China).
Sadly, the same is true here. Polar explorer and Medal of Honor winner Admiral Byrd was locked up until 1955 after returning from the 1946 Operation Highjump and his public talk in South America of threats to the U.S. from both poles. SecNav James Forrestal was sent to Bethesda Naval Hospital and suicided while there because he wanted to tell the American people about UFOs. They are but two recipients in the U.S. of similar forced commitment. The most famous/notorious was President Richard Nixon, who, like the first two Americans named, wanted to reveal the truth about UFOs and flying saucers. Nixon's attempt at lame duck presidential Disclosure got him a free trip to Bethesda, and when he got out, he wasn't talking about UFOs anymore!
Of Cosmonauts & Coverups
If you thought the Russians hid only their combat casualties in the Battle of Berlin and a long string of nuclear accidents, to include that little thing called Chernobyl, take a look at a sampler of their space program lies, coverups, distortions, rewritings of history, injured cosmonauts, killed cosmonauts and mysteriously vanished cosmonauts. The link is to a chapter from James Oberg's book Uncovering Soviet Disasters. Did you know the Russians even managed to immolate Marshal of the Strategic Rocket Forces Nedelin and hide all but the bare (and deliberately misreported) announcement of his death? The story of the launch pad holocaust is detailed here, together with period footage of high tech hell. Strongly suggest the video not be viewed close to/during meals. Graphic and possibly mind-scarring!
Nazi A-Bomb & Mass Russian Casualties–In the Wrong Units!
When researching long-buried, highly sensitive and emotionally freighted matters, it's easy to get sucked into a credibility-destroying mode occasioned by the latest juicy morsel of “hot dope” to arrive. I barely survived that maelstrom when, after much imploring, a Russian source provided the names of the units devastated by the Nazi A-Bomb attack.
Fantastic, right? I thought so until I wisely looked into the parent formations of the 18th and 27th Rifle Corps and the 3rd Tank Corps. The first thing I did after collecting myself was to do extended digging to verify a) these units existed at the time and b) they fought at Kursk. That exploration determined the named units met all the criteria listed, but further delving indicated what I unearthed was necessary, but not sufficient, to make my case. The Rifle Corps were part of the Batov's 65th Army, while the 3rd Tank Corps was part of Rodin's 2nd Tank Army. Which meant? The Nazi A-Bomb had apparently detonated in two widely separated locations, yet clobbered three different Red Army corps!
I knew the Germans had some incredible weaponry, but this was too much. The map showed Batov's 65th Army was in static defensive positions right on the front of the Kursk salient, a bit north of the center of its vertical extent as part of Rokossovky's Central Front. And by static, I mean like this, page 12. Not only were the 18th and 27th Rifle Corps dug in and in depth, but they were “leg” units, infantry units whose men walked and whose heavy gear generally moved by horses.
And what of the 3rd Tank Corps? Turns out it was up north as part of 2nd Tank Army, fighting desperately to prevent Model's Ninth Army from driving south to Kursk. If you look at the map, 2nd Tank Army is right at the tip of the German spearhead attacking from the top of the salient toward Kursk. So, I now have infantry and tank units separated by some 60 miles! What's wrong with this picture?
Pretty much everything! For starters, it doesn't pass the military sniff test. The units are too far apart, and only the 3rd Tank Corps saw combat. The defending 18th and 27th Rifle Corps simply sat in place and stared across at the Germans opposite, also defending in place. Things look more promising with the 3rd Tank Corps, but only if the rifle corps are ignored outright. This, of course, doesn't square with the overall claim.
Atop that, the new information also stated that the Nazi A-bomb caused ~10,000 Russian casualties and the permanent loss of 152 tanks. As seen here in the July 1943 unit breakdown for the 18th Tank Corps, losing 152 tanks is not merely devastating, but virtually annihilating. What else would you call near instantly losing 152 tanks from the no more than (and probably much less than) 210 tanks of the unit at full strength?
So, we can now chuck the unit names, for both geographic and military reasons. Not only is something rotten in Denmark, but I can smell it from here!
Further queries elicited some remarkable details. They may be summarized like this:
Stalin then and the Russian government now will never admit the Nazis nuked Russian troops at Kursk. To hide the 10,000 losses, all of which occurred on July 11, 1943, the day of the Nazi A-bomb strike, they were falsely apportioned to other units, thus hiding the identities of and casualties taken by the actual nuked formations. This ultimately undid the deception, once the unit positions were sorted out and properly understood. So, where does that leave us?
The current best assessment is that the loss figures are right, but the units are wrong. In turn, this means we're now back in the very same II SS Panzer Corps sector prior analyses had revealed to be the most probable. Recourse to the map at the top of the post shows that the only tank corps close enough to the fighting on July 11, 1943, and in the II SS Panzer Corps sector, was Katukov's 1st Tank Army which, with Chistiakov's 6th Guards Army, formed part of Vatutin's Voronezh Front. 1st Tank Army and 6th guards Army are therefore the most likely units to have been nuked.
Presuming the force types and sizes first given by the Russian source are right and the unit names wrong, it would appear that two defending unknown rifle corps (of 6th Guards) and one unknown tank corps (part of 1st Tank) were in the right place at the wrong time when SS General Kammler successfully conducted his nuclear proof of concept test and combat trial of the deep black A-Waffe (A-Weapon or Atomic Weapon), the Nazi A-Bomb, at Kursk, Russia, July 11, 1943.
Nazi A-Bomb: Latest Update from the Operation Paperclip Scientists' Progeny
Freshly received information from the progeny of the Operation Paperclip scientists who worked on the Nazi A-Bomb indicates the Nazi A-bomb crater was ~1.5 miles in diameter, with a principal depth of 1-3′ except for a deeper central region of 7-10′ and of some 700-1000′ diameter. The sources went on to state the delivery vehicle was a “damaged Panzer, with no turret and the Bomb strapped on top.” Further, they believe that the armor steel of the Panzer's top armor was the likely cause for an extremely large and shallow crater. Why? The armor kept the blast from blast from going downward, so it went sideways instead.
Nazi A-Bomb! Where We Stand on Locating Ground Zero/Detonation Site
The above is about as good as it gets unless or until access to primary sources (e.g. period reports to Stalin), radiological survey either specifically targeted to find the Nazi A-Bomb's detonation site or, perhaps, as a result of field research in botany or crops. Maybe some sort of satellite data could be obtained?
Knowledgeable contacts have said the satellite imaging methods which have found the traces of ancient rivers simply don't have enough depth variation to work from. There may be some possibilities via IR imaging. In the past, it has revealed structures below ground via foliage differences which normal human sight can't detect, but which do show up when seen through spectra below the ability of human eyes to see.
In any event, since the location of the Nazi A-bomb attack has been dramatically narrowed from what it was when this series began, it should now be possible to perform a reasonably cued search, a search in which the looking is fairly confined, as opposed to covering a vast area in search of what effectively amounts, in terms of relative ground occupied, to something smaller than a gnat, if that.